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INTRODUCTION
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 bars discovery of communications between doctor and
patient and contains no enumerated exception for the disclosure of non-party patient
medical records, with the patient's name and other "identifying information" redacted.
St. Mark's made this point in its Opening Brief and Plaintiff does not dispute it.
Nevertheless, despite the Advisory Committee's stated intention that "exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,"1 and this Court's holding in Burns v.
Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 377 (Utah 2006) that the only exceptions to the physician-patient
privilege are those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d), Plaintiff urges this Court to
affirm the district court's order granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel production of the
redacted medical records of six non-party patients who have never been provided with
notice of the ordered disclosure of their medical files.
I.

RULE 506 PROHIBITS THE DISCLOSURE OF THE NON-PARTY
PATIENT MEDICAL RECORDS SOUGHT IN THIS CASE,
A. The Plain Language Of Rule 506 Applies To Protect The Confidences
Of The Six Non-Party Patients Whose Records Were Ordered
Disclosed In This Case,

Plaintiff does not dispute that the district court's production order compels St.
Mark's to reveal the private, confidential medical information of six former hospital
patients who are not parties to this case and have no interest in its outcome. Nor does
Plaintiff dispute (PL Br. at 12, n.2) that the medical information contained in the records

1

In Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006), this Court stated that, "although not
authoritative, the advisory committee notes to the Utah Rules of Evidence merit great
weight in any interpretation of those rules." Id. at 377 n.6 (emphasis added).
1

of these six non-party patients falls squarely within the material expressly protected by
Rule 506, namely (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or
mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or
mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis
or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.

U.R.E. 506(b) (West 2008).
Nor does Plaintiff dispute that St. Mark's has standing to assert the physician-patient
privilege on behalf of these six non-party patients whose records Plaintiff seeks to obtain
(PL Br. at 12, n.2). Instead, Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief sets forth a variety of arguments in
support of her assertion that the district court's ruling was not erroneous but, as set forth
below, none are meritorious. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's
order requiring disclosure of the six non-party patients' medical records.
B. Plaintiff May Not Rely On The "At-Issue" Exception Because It Was
Not Argued Below And Thus Presents No Issue For This Appeal.
Aware of the Advisory Committee's notes and this Court's holding in Burns,
supra, Plaintiffs Brief (PL Br. at 11) claims that one of the enumerated exceptions
contained in Rule 506(d) applies, namely the "at issue" exception providing:
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of
any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in
which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or
defense; . . . .

2

U.R.E. 506(d)(1) (West 2008).
Relying on this exception, Plaintiff argues that the district court's order must be
affirmed because St. Mark's "failed to come forward with any explanation as to why the
at issue exception does not apply." (PL Br. at 17). However, St. Mark's had no obligation
to explain why the "at issue" exception does not apply in its Opening Brief because
Plaintiff never raised that exception to the district court and the exception was not the
basis of the district court's order.

Thus, the issue is waived for this appeal. See Carrier

v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, 1219 (Utah 2004) (appellee waived for review issue
concerning attorney's fees because appellee failed to raise issue before the district court).
As this Court held in State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56 (Utah 2002), a party attempting to
invoke the "at issue" exception in Rule 506(d) must satisfy two high standards of proof:
First, Plaintiff must establish through independent evidence that there is a
reasonable certainty that the records protected by the physician-patient privilege
contain information favorable to Plaintiffs case; and
Second, the district court must then conduct an in camera inspection of the
privileged records to determine their materiality, and then conclude that they
contain evidence material to the case. Blake, 63 P.3d at 61-62.
Here, because Plaintiff never raised the "at issue" exception below, she obviously
made no attempt to meet either of these "stringent test[s]," Blake, 63 P.3d at 61. Plaintiff
never introduced any extrinsic evidence establishing to a reasonable certainty that the six
non-party patients' records at issue contain information favorable to Plaintiffs case and
never submitted the documents to the district court for a materiality review. Accordingly,
3

the issue was not presented or preserved below, and there is no issue for this Court to
review.
C. In Any Event, The "AMssue" Exception Does Not Apply In This Case.
While Plaintiffs failure to rely on the "at issue" exception below renders the point
moot for this appeal, Plaintiffs belated "at-issue" argument should also be rejected on its
face, because the non-party patients' medical conditions are not "an element of any claim
or defense" in this case within the meaning of U.R.E. 506(d)(1).
The plain language of the rule states that the "at-issue" exception to the physicianpatient privilege is limited to instances where the "condition of the patient in any
proceeding" is an element of a claim or defense in the case. U.R.E. 506(d)(1) (emphasis
added). This exception to the privilege is obviously intended to serve as a limitation on a
party-patient's ability to prevent disclosure by claiming the privilege after placing his/her
medical condition at issue as part of his/her claim or defense. It is a recognition of the
policy that where a party places his/her physical, mental, or emotional condition at issue
in a case, that party implicitly and necessarily waives his/her right to assert the privilege
and prevent disclosure of his/her confidential medical information.

See Clawson v.

Walgreen Drug Co., 162 P.2d 759, 764 (Utah 1945) ("a patient cannot testify concerning
what was said and done by his physician in the treatment of the injuries which are the
subject of the litigation and then close the physician's mouth by claiming privilege.").
That the exception applies only to a party who puts his or medical condition at
issue is supported by the comments to the rule. The Advisory Committee explicitly states
that "Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence." U.R.E.
4

506, Advisory Committee Note (West 2008).

Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of

Evidence states that the exception applies when the communication at issue is "relevant
to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the patient's
claim or defense." UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(3). After limiting the scope of the exception to
patients who put their medical conditions at issue while the patient is alive, the uniform
rule then expands the scope of the exception after a patient's death to permit disclosure
when any party puts that patient's medical condition at issue. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(3).
Plaintiff argues that the language used in Utah's Rule 506 evidences an intent by
the courts in Utah to broaden the scope of the exception to include live parties who do not
put their medical condition at issue. But the Advisory Committee Notes provide no
indication of such an intent to deviate from the scope of the corresponding uniform rule.
To the contrary, the fact that Utah's Rule 506(d)(1) replicates the distinction between
living patients and deceased patients found in Uniform Rule 503(d)(3) makes clear that
Utah's rule applies to permit disclosure of the confidences of live patients only where that
patient puts their medical condition at issue. If that were not the case, the second half of
the Utah rule which permits the disclosure of a deceased party's medical records where
any party puts the patient's medical condition at issue would be superfluous. See Carter
v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469 (Utah 2006) (interpretations that
will render a portion of a statute superfluous or inoperative should be avoided).
In any event, whether the rule applies only to the party who puts his or her medical
condition at issue or to any party, there is no support for the argument advanced by the
5

plaintiff that the exception to the rule applies to all patients, even those who have no
interest whatsoever in the litigation. As this Court discussed in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 111
P.3d 614 (Utah 2008), the scope of the "at-issue" exception is limited: "rule 506(d)(1) is
a limited waiver of privilege, confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the
treatment related to the condition at issue" Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
The few cases cited by Plaintiff, where this Court has applied the "at-issue"
exception to the records of persons other than the plaintiff bringing a malpractice action,
are consistent with this "related to the condition at issue" requirement. In State v.
Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah 1999), and State v. Worthed 111 P.3d 664 (Ut. Ct. App.
2008), the criminal defendant was permitted to raise the mental state of the victim - the
complaining witness and on whose behalf (as well as her fellow state citizens) the State
was prosecuting the defendant - because it was "an important element of [his] defense."
Id at 86.
The six non-party patients' records at issue in this case do not fall within the
holding or rationale of Cardall, or Worthen. In criminal cases, the complaining victim is
equivalent to the party who puts his or her medical condition at issue. Here, the nonparty patients have no connection whatsoever to the litigation. Moreover, as this Court
noted in Cardall, there are constitutional protections that obligate the State to produce
evidence to the defendant in a criminal trial. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 480 U.S. 39, 57
(1987); Cardall 982 P.2d 79 at 85. Such constitutional issues do not exist in a civil case
such as this. In this case, at best, Plaintiff hopes (but never established) that these non-

6

party patients' records might provide some tangential support for her negligent staffing
claim - a claim that in itself is of dubious merit, see Point II, infra.
Plaintiff also cites Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000) to support
the applicability of the exception here. There, the court applied the exception to permit
disclosure of communications a wife made to her therapist when she sought alimony
against her husband. To the extent that case holds that disclosure was proper where the
wife did not put her medical condition "at issue" that decision was not reviewed and has
never been approved by this Court. Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Utah 2000), cert,
denied, 9 P.3d 170, (Utah 2000). In any event, Derby's rationale does not apply here
where the six patients are not even parties to the lawsuit, much less parties who put their
medical condition at issue.
Plaintiffs contrary interpretation of the "at-issue" exception would completely
eviscerate the privilege and mean that the confidential medical information contained in
any non-party patient's records could be disclosed to third parties upon the barest
showing of any possible relevance to pending litigation - contrary to the express
language of the Rule and the remedial purpose of the physician-patient privilege. Indeed,
if such a minimal showing were all that is required, patients would no longer be the sole
holders of the privilege with respect to their confidential medical information, contrary to
Utah's recognition that the physician-patient privilege belongs to the patient, Debry, 999
P.2d at 585, and "enables a patient to prevent a physician 'from disclosing diagnoses

7

made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician", Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177
P.3d 614, 617 (Utah 2008)(emphasis added).
D. Even Where A Statutory Exception Applies, The Patients Whose
Records Are Sought Must Be Given Notice Of The Requested
Disclosure.
Plaintiffs belated "at-issue" exception argument is further groundless, because
even where an exception to the physician-patient privilege is established under Rule
506(d), the patient whose records are sought must first be given notice. Debry v. Goates,
999 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Utah 2000) (before disclosing confidential patient records or
communications, "a patient must at least be afforded the opportunity for protection" by
receiving notice of the intended disclosure); State v. Yount, 182 P.3d 405, 409 (Ut. Ct.
App. 2008) (a patient's right to notice of the requested disclosure of his/her confidential
medical records "does not change even where the records allegedly contain
communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege"). Here it
is undisputed that none of the non-party patients whose records Plaintiff seeks have ever
been given notice of these proceedings, and thus they have never been afforded that
required opportunity to protect the confidentiality of their medical records.
E. Under Rule 506, Redaction Of The Patients' Names And Other
"Identifying Information" From The Non-Party Patient Records Does
Not Permit Disclosure Of The Personal And Confidential Medical
Information Contained In Those Records.
1. There Is No Redaction Exception To Rule 506.
As she did below, Plaintiff refers this Court to the "vast majority" of states other
than Utah that have permitted the disclosure of redacted medical records.

8

But the

majority is not as "vast" as the Plaintiff claims, as several courts have reached the
opposite conclusion, with many yet to address the issue. See e.g., Elkstrom v. Temple,
197 111. App. 3d 120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (production of non-party patients' medical
records prohibited under physician-patient privilege, even when identifying information
is redacted); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 727 So.2d 647, 650 (La. Ct. App.
1999) (non-party patients' medical records are not discoverable even with identifying
information redacted, absent statutory exception, consent from non-party patients, or
contradictory hearing at which the non-party patients were present and represented by
counsel); Popp v. Crittendom Hospital, 181 Mich. App. 662, 665 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(physician-patient privilege is an absolute bar prohibiting the disclosure of medical
records of non-party patients); Ortiz v. Ikeda, 2001 WL 660107 at 2 (Del. Super. Ct.
2001) (court was not persuaded that redaction of identifying information adequately
protects a patient's legitimate expectation of privacy); In re Columbia Valley Regional
Medical Center, 41 S.W.3d 797, 800-801 (Tex. App. 2001) (redaction of identification
information does not overcome protections of physician-patient privilege and render
medical records discoverable); Yoe v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2003 WL 549923 at
3 (Ohio Ct. App, 2003) (because party had access to information from sources other than
non-party patient medical records, physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of nonparty records); Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL
432222 at 1-2 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (disclosure of marginally relevant non-party patient
medical records, even with all identifying information redacted, would violate the nonparty patients' right to privacy); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 111. App. 3d
9

850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) (disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even with the
names and identifying numbers of the patients redacted, would violate the physicianpatient privilege); and Wozniakv. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 at 5 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991)
(physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even
with identifying information redacted).
Moreover, counting cases from other states is an academic exercise. This case
must be decided on the basis of Utah law and no other. This means that in order to avoid
the physician-patient privilege set forth in Rule 506, Plaintiff must establish that the nonparty patient medical records sought here fall into one of the exceptions enumerated in
Rule 506(d). This she has failed to do and, as set forth above, her belated attempt to
invoke the "at issue" exception is procedurally and substantively improper.
2. Redaction Does Not Provide The Requisite Notice To The NonParty Patients Or Ensure That The Confidentiality Of Their
Medical Records Will Be Protected.
Even with names redacted, the district court's order permits total strangers access
to the non-party patients' most confidential, personal and intimate medical information
concerning their "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or
mental health therapist," "information obtained by examination of the patient," and
"information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapists, and
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment" - the very information Rule
506 expressly protects from disclosure - all without notice to those non-party patients.
As set forth above, this is contrary to Utah law holding that even where (unlike here) an
exception applies, the person whose medical records are at issue must still be given
10

notice before their protected information is disclosed. See State v. Yount, 182 P.3d 405,
409 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008) (a patient's right to notice of the requested disclosure of his/her
confidential medical records "does not change even where the records allegedly contain
communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege"). As
stated in a case cited in Plaintiffs brief, Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Utah
App. 2000):
As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist has an obligation
to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he has
as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in
pending litigation. Before disclosing confidential patient records or
communications in a subsequent litigation, a physician or therapist should
notify the patient. Even if the communications may fall into this exception
to the privilege, the patient has the right to be notified of the potential
disclosure of confidential records. Such notice assures that the patient can
pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary
disclosure.
Debry, 999 P.2d at 587-88 (emphasis added).
In addition, no one can be certain that deletion of the non-party patients' names
and "other identifying information" would in all cases preclude the patients from being
identified. As recognized by other courts, redaction does not necessarily safeguard the
non-party patients' confidentiality or their expectation of privacy in their medical records.
See Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 111. App. 3d 120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (deletion of patient
identifying information "may not sufficiently protect the confidentiality to which the
nonparty patients are entitled"); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 111. App. 3d
850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Whether the patients' identities would remain confidential by
the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is questionable at best."); Wozniak
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v. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 at 5 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) (physician-patient privilege
barred disclosure of non-party medical records, even with identifying information
redacted, because the risk of disclosing a patient's identity could "not be entirely
eliminated" through redaction of identifying information).
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006), is not to the contrary, and Plaintiffs
reliance on Burns (PL Br. at 20) disregards the substantially dissimilar circumstances
between Burns and the present case. In Burns, it was law enforcement officials who
sought non-party patient medical records as part of their criminal investigation
concerning alleged insurance fraud on the part of the defendant physician, not litigants in
a civil medical malpractice lawsuit. Thus, the Burns court held that the defendant
physician was not even entitled to the presumption that he had the authority to raise the
physician-patient privilege on behalf of the non-party patients. 133 P. 3d at 379. Plaintiff
concedes that there is no such issue here, and that St. Mark's has the right to raise the
physician-patient privilege on behalf of the six non-party patients whose records Plaintiff
seeks. (PL Br. at 12, n.2).
Further, as this Court recognized in Burns, Utah Code section 31A-31-104( 1 )(b)
requires "an insurer . . . [to] release to [an] authorized agency . . . infarmation or evidence
that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud." Burns, 133 P.3d at 379. Because
disclosure is required by law, this Court concluded that "it is doubtful that patients have
any expectation that the privilege would shield their records from law enforcement
officials in a case" involving suspected insurance fraud, but instead "would expect that
their insurance company could assist law enforcement to respond to that activity" by
12

disclosure of their medical records. Id. at 379. Conversely, in a case such as this which
does not involve evidence of a crime or law enforcement officials seeking patient medical
records or a statute requiring disclosure, non-party patients' expectations that their
intimate medical records will not be disclosed without their knowledge or consent remain
steadfast.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S

PURPORTED

NEED

FOR

THE

NON-PARTY

PATIENT RECORDS IS BOTH IRRELEVANT AND UNFOUNDED.
A. Rule 506 Contains No "Need" Exception.
Plaintiffs argument about her "need" for the non-party patient records (PL Br. at
24-29) is in essence another attempt to create an exception to Rule 506 that does not
exist. Rule 506 contains no "need" exception. Again, under Burns, the only exceptions to
the physician-patient privilege are those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d), 133
P.3d at 377. As this Court recognized in Blake, 63 P. 3d at 61, it is the "very nature" of
all privileges, including the physician-patient privilege, that certain facts or information,
while true, may never be revealed. This is recognized as a "good policy choice [],
fostering candor in important relationships by promising protection of confidential
disclosures." Id.
Furthermore, as set forth below, Plaintiffs "need" arguments are as unfounded as
they are irrelevant.
B. Plaintiff Misapprehends This Court's Holding in Clover v. Snowbird
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
In her Brief, Plaintiff asserts that this Court's holding in Clover stands for the
proposition that "a plaintiff may pursue a direct-liability claim against an employer
13

'regardless' of the employee's status." (PL Br. at 25). Plaintiff misapprehends this
Court's holding. In Clover, an employment relationship was denied. In this context, this
Court held that even if the purported employee was acting outside the scope of
employment so as not to impute liability to the employer, an employer can still be held
directly liable for its own negligence in hiring and supervising employees. Here there is
no employment issue. St. Mark's has already admitted an employment relationship and
its responsibility for the acts/omissions of Nurse Stallings in caring for Plaintiff. Thus,
Nurse Stallings' acts have become its own and St. Mark's liability is solely dependent on
whether those acts/omissions were negligent and a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries.
Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to establish that St. Mark's nursing staff, including Angela
Stallings, was negligent and that said negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs
injuries, there is no basis to find St. Mark's liable for negligent staffing. See the cases
cited in St. Mark's Opening Brief (pp. 16-17).
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions (PI. Br. at 25-26), the negligent staffing claim
will have no effect on the jury's ability to apportion fault between St. Mark's and Dr.
Jolles under Utah's comparative fault statutes. As discussed above,

Plaintiffs

understaffing claim cannot stand alone, and by itself can impose no liability on St.
Mark's. With or without the negligent staffing claim, Plaintiff cannot recover against St.
Mark's unless she proves that St. Mark's nursing staff violated the standard of care in the
care and treatment they rendered to Plaintiff and that such standard of care violation was
a proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. Thus, if causal fault is assessed against St.
Mark's at all, it will be based on Plaintiffs proof of her nursing negligence claim, and her
14

negligence staffing claim will not provide any separate basis upon which to apportion
fault to St. Mark's.
C.

The Non-Party Patient Records Are Irrelevant To Plaintiffs Punitive
Damages Claim,

In her Brief, Plaintiff argues that she "may also assert an understaffing claim
because plaintiff seeks punitive damages against St. Mark's based on its knowing and
reckless failure to staff the hospital with sufficient nurses" and that "the non-party
medical records are directly relevant to [her] claim for punitive damages." (PL Br. at 26)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff has been allowed to file a punitive damages claim over St. Mark's
objection, (R. 689-703).

But Plaintiffs claim that she needs the non-party patient

medical records to determine the non-party patients' acuity to support her punitive
damages claim, manifests either a lack of understanding of "patient acuity" or a lack of
understanding of the kind of conduct Plaintiff must prove in order to recover punitive
damages against St. Mark's.

Plaintiffs punitive damages theory, as alleged in her

Amended Complaint (R.704-11), is that St. Mark's management knowingly and
recklessly understaffed St. Mark's for budgetary reasons. See Hodges v. Gibson Products
Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991).
An individual patient's acuity on a particular night is not relevant to this
determination. The evidence relevant to such management staffing issue is the
information contained in St. Mark's Staffing Patterns Table, the patient census sheet, the
charge reports and the staff matrix materials (R.966-993, 1030), which have already been
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provided to Plaintiff and relied upon by Plaintiffs expert in rendering opinions on this
staffing management issue. (R.310-11). Patient acuity, on the other hand, pertains to the
individual patient's condition and the amount of nursing care that condition requires.
As established by the affidavit of How-Su Chen, the nursing manager of the 4 W
unit at St. Mark's, patient acuity is something that is assessed in terms of a patient's
particular needs during a particular nursing shift, and can change from shift to shift, or
even hour to hour or moment to moment within a shift. (Affidavit, p.3) (R. 1055). It is
determined primarily from oral discussions with the patients' nursing care providers on
the scene, (Affidavit pp. 3-4) (R. 1055), and can result in the staffing on the unit being
rearranged during a shift, calling in nurses from other floors, or transferring patients to
another floor where more nursing care is available. (Affidavit, pp.3-4)(R. 1055-56). The
individual factors considered are the need for complex technology and equipment,
wound-drain care, medication administration, pain level, vital signs, dependent care
needs, mobility, psychosocial-emotional status and family dynamics, to name a few.
(Affidavit, p. 3) (R.1055). It was in this context that How-Su Chen stated in her affidavit
that patient acuity would be one of many factors to determine whether the staffing was
appropriate at any given point in time.None of these on-the-spot staffing decisions involving patient acuity are the
management type decisions that form the basis for Plaintiffs punitive damage claim in
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that she needs to determine the
- Obviously, if this Court reverses the district court's order compelling St. Mark's to
produce the non-party patients' medical records, St. Mark's will not seek to introduce any
testimony of How-Su Chen based on her review of those records. (PI. Br. at 16-17).
16

non-party patients' acuity to sustain her punitive damages claim is legally and factually
erroneous. Again, the managerial staffing decisions that are the subject of her punitive
damages claim are done without accounting for individual patient acuity, (Deposition of
Melissa Lewis, p. 18) (R.661), and Plaintiff has all the evidence relevant to that issue. (R.
966-993, 1030).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in St. Mark's Opening Brief, this Court should
reverse the district court's order compelling St. Mark's to disclose non-party patient
records, and hold that Utah's physician-patient privilege bars any disclosure of the nonparty patient medical records sought in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
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